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Spain’s capacity market: how long could batteries bid at zero?

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Spain’s capacity market: how long could batteries bid at zero?

​Spain’s first capacity market auction will procure firm capacity from assets with different reasons for participating. New projects may need payments to make investment viable, while existing generators may need them to cover fixed costs that their other earnings cannot meet. Batteries could require no additional support because forecasted merchant revenues already make investment viable.

If batteries offer capacity at zero and enough lower-priced capacity meets the procurement target, existing generators needing positive payments could receive no contract. With firm capacity purchased elsewhere, an unsuccessful plant unable to cover its costs would have an economic reason to seek to close.

Combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) illustrate this case while also providing local grid services. Would those plants be allowed to retire, and would their replacement provide the reliability contribution assumed at auction?

Using Modo Energy’s October 2026 Spain Forecast, we explore these questions for a first main auction assumed in 2027, with delivery starting in 2031. Replacing gas with batteries changes both their revenues and their contribution to reliability, potentially raising future support requirements.

​Key takeaways

  • ​Batteries can initially offer firm capacity at zero price in the first capacity market auction. None of the modelled durations needs support at an 11% real hurdle rate.
  • Gas replacement raises battery needs in the subsequent capacity auctions. An 8 GW CCGT retirement brings 10.3 GW of additional batteries, reducing their merchant revenues by 14–17%.
  • Unchanged de-rating factors can overstate replacement capacity. Reassessing the larger battery fleet’s reliability contribution can reveal a firm-capacity shortfall.
  • Local grid services would also need replacing. CCGTs supplied 76% of phase 1 technical-restriction volume between 2025 and 2026, adding a locational consideration to retirement decisions.

​The de-rating factor of batteries falls as more batteries connect

​The economics of a capacity market contract depend on how much of an asset’s installed capacity can be contracted. This is represented by the de-rating factor, which determines how much of the asset’s installed capacity can bid in the auction. A 100 MW asset with a factor of 0.66, for example, can offer 66 MW of firm capacity. The lower the de-rating factor the higher the bids, as the necessary revenues have to be divided over less MWs of firm capacity.

The de-rating factor is based on an asset’s estimated contribution during system stress. This contribution depends on the electricity mix and the stress periods that result. As batteries discharge, they flatten peaks in demand relative to available supply, leaving longer stress periods that a fixed-duration battery has a harder time clearing. Each battery therefore contributes less firm capacity as the fleet grows, reducing its de-rating factor.

Installed battery capacity rises from 9.2 GW in 2031 to 24.6 GW in 2050 in the October 2026 Forecast. Over that period, estimated de-rating falls from 0.66 to 0.33 for 6-hour batteries and from 0.32 to 0.14 for 2-hour batteries. Longer durations retain higher contributions, but all modelled durations lose around half their initial de-rating value.

​The factor estimated for delivery in 2031 determines how much capacity a battery can bid in the assumed first auction. Alongside merchant revenues, it determines the additional payment needed to make investment viable.

The decline in the de-rating factor poses an important dilemma. From a battery operator’s perspective, a higher de-rating factor increases potential earnings, but increases the risk of not meeting requirements as the de-rating decreases over time.

Capacity market 2027 auction: batteries could offer firm capacity with no additional support

​Under the October 2026 Forecast, a 50 MW, 4-hour battery earns €137k per installed MW from merchant markets in 2031. Across the investment assessment, no modelled duration requires capacity market support at an 11% real hurdle rate. At 12% only the 2-hour battery needs a payment of €12.9k per de-rated MW per year.

We calculate this as the annual payment needed over an assumed capacity-contract term of ten years to reach its target returns after merchant revenues. Dividing this amount per installed MW and by its de-rating factor reveals the required capacity payment per de-rated MW, which remains zero if merchant earnings already meet the investment hurdle.

​This gives batteries margin to undercut existing generators with uncovered fixed costs. For CCGTs, the CNMC estimates annual fixed costs of €18–22k per installed MW in 2024 euros, equivalent to €22–27k per de-rated MW in real 2025 euros at a 0.82 de-rating factor. This presents an upper bound of bids for these assets, as it doesn’t account for revenues in the different markets. For context, existing assets bid an average of approximately €16k per de-rated MW per year in Belgium’s 2025/26 one-year auction.

Our battery calculations also measure required support rather than predict actual offers, which could be higher under Spain’s pay-as-bid design. Whether batteries displace existing generators therefore depends on bidding behaviour, participation and procurement demand.

A CCGT without a capacity contract and uncovered fix costs may then seek to close, and, from a reliability perspective, it would no longer be needed, as the system would have acquired the required firm capacity elsewhere. Whether it can safely close depends on the replacement fleet’s reliability contribution and the local services it provides.

​Replacing CCGTs with batteries raises the capacity market support new batteries need

​To study the effect of CCGT retirement, we model CCGT retirements ranging from 2 GW to the full fleet, allowing only batteries to replace the lost firm capacity. This isolates the substitution effect, although other technologies could enter in practice.

Because of the different de-rating factors, replacing one GW of gas requires more than one GW of batteries. An 8 GW CCGT reduction brings 10.3 GW of additional batteries, rising to 25.3 GW in the full-retirement sensitivity.

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